INTRODUCTION
T HE QUESTION WHETHER Canadian or American courts should enforce their laws in a manner that respects the laws of friendly sovereign states has recently been examined by the Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Their decisions will be the object of this note in the light of recent developments in Canada-United States relations in the area of legal assistance in civil and criminal matters.
Often our courts are asked to compel a person not a party to the litigation or investigation to produce documents or give evidence in Canada when to do so might or does constitute a criminal offence where the information originated or must be obtained. How can the witness choose between the conflicting commands of two states? Does the principle of equality of states demand that these conflicting commands be given equal weight so that the witness will not be penalized if he or she obeys one or the other or should the lex fori always prevail, especially in criminal matters, in order not to frustrate the administration of justice in Canada? Are there other ways to resolve this dilemma which respect international law principles? More generally, to what extent is the foreign state compulsion defence available in a Canadian or American civil or criminal trial? RECENT DEVELOPMENTS In Spencer v. R.,' the Supreme Court of Canada in a unanimous decision was of the opinion that a Canadian citizen employee of the Royal Bank of Canada who, while now a resident of Canada, was at the relevant time the bank manager for a branch in the Bahamas could not refuse to answer questions when subpoenaed as a witness by the Crown at the trial in Canada of an accused charged with evading Canadian income taxes, concerning transactions by the accused at that branch, on the ground that disclosure of the information requested could expose him to a criminal prosecution in the Bahamas.
The relevant Bahamian legislation 2 provides that a bank employee shall not, without the express or implied consent of the customer concerned, disclose to any person any information relating to the identity, assets, liabilities, transactions, or accounts of a customer. Every person who contravenes this legislation is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine or to a term of imprisonment or to both.
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the issue of the compellability of a witness in a Canadian court from the point of view of the liberty and security of the person provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 3 and from the point of view of public and private international law principles.
With respect to the Charter, it is sufficient to say that the court was of the opinion that the infringement of liberty or security, if any, did not result from the application of Canadian law but solely from that of Bahamian law in the Bahamas. Thus, the Charter has no extraterritorial effect.
From the point of view of public and private international law principles, the Supreme Court of Canada felt that the principle of sovereign equality of states as applied to the Bahamas had not been violated. On the contrary, to have given effect to the laws of that state by allowing the witness to refuse to testify with impunity would have constituted a violation of Canadian sovereignty since the result would have been the frustration of the administration of justice in Canada in respect of a Canadian citizen in relation to an essentially domestic situation. The court was of the opinion that Canada's interest in enforcing its taxation laws must take priority over the interest of the Bahamas to ensure for its own public policy reasons the confidentiality of banking transactions.
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Estey adopted a more conciliatory view with respect to the method to be followed when he declared that international comity dictates that orders to compel a witness to give evidence should not be made lightly when they result in a violation or an unnecessary circumvention of the laws or procedures of a friendly foreign state. He pointed out that in such cases a preferable method would be to grant a stay of proceedings at the trial level to allow the witness sufficient time to apply to the foreign court for an order permitting disclosure which would exempt him or her from criminal liability. Only where such an order had not been sought or obtained within a reasonable period of time would the Canadian trial court have the power to compel the witness. ' Mr. Justice LaForest in his opinion specifically approved the reasons given by the Ontario Court of Appeal, which relied on public and private international law principles.
The Court of Appeal stated that whether or not a person is a compellable witness is a question which must be characterized as a matter of procedure governed by the lex fori. The fact that Bahamian law prohibited the witness from testifying was irrelevant. Even if compellability had been characterized as a matter of substance, still public and private international law hold that the courts of one state are not bound to recognize and enforce the criminal laws and judgments of another state.' This principle is based primarily on the territorial nature of the criminal law as the expression of the public policy of the enacting state.! The answer would have been the same if the Bahamas had given its Banks and Trusts Companies Regulation Act an extraterritorial effect, as a distinction is made between the capacity of the state under international law to prescribe 4 Supra note i.
• S. io( i) (iii) of the Bahamian law, supra note 2, to that effect except with respect to tax matters. Appeal also invoked the general principle of private international law that Canadian courts will not recognize and enforce foreign laws whether or not they are intended to have a territorial or extraterritorial effect when they conflict with our fundamental ideas or institutions, in other words, when they are contrary to the fundamental public policy of Canada.' In the immediate case, the fundamental public policy was the right of the citizens and the courts to obtain relevant evidence from every person competent to give it. The Court of Appeal considered Frischke et al. v. Royal Bank of Canada et al. ,"° one of its earlier decisions, where the plaintiff brought a civil action against his daughter and her husband charging that they had fraudulently converted funds belonging to him. To support his claim, he sought records from the Panamanian branch of the Royal Bank of Canada. The trial judge ordered the bank to obtain the information in question from the employees of that branch although compliance would be against Panamanian banking and secrecy laws as they affect banking and banking accounts in that state. The Court of Appeal reversed this order and held that since "[ain Ontario court would not order a person here to break our laws; we should not make an order that would require someone to compel another person in that jurisdiction to break the laws of that state. We respect those laws."' In response to a submission made by the petitioner that the Court of Appeal should balance the interests of the forum including necessary urgency in tracing funds, as against the unlikely event that a breach of the foreign law would bring heavy penalties or punishment, that court declined to speculate on how the matter would be regarded in Panama and said:
We note that there is a Court in that jurisdiction that has power to authorize the production of the information requested, and perhaps an application should be made to that tribunal rather than circumvent its authority. In no case between private interests to which we have been referred has an order such as that in question been upheld. Ings et al. v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, a case in the United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit, is of persuasive value dealing with comparable issues. The judgment concludes with a statement which is apt where it was said that upon fundamental principles of international comity our courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such action as may well cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbour or at least an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures: see also Re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 61 1.12
In R. v. Spencer, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that Frischke could be distinguished as the facts were different. Unlike Frischke, which involved information located in Panama to be produced in Canada in violation of Panamanian law, in Spencer the witness was a resident Canadian citizen testifying in Canada. He was not ordered to produce records from the bank's branch in the Bahamas in violation of the law of that state but simply to rely on his memory. To give effect to the Bahamian law in these circumstances would be to recognize that it had an extraterritorial effect. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada were not prepared to protect foreign bank secrecy at all costs. Where the evidence is located in the forum, the subpoena must be honoured. Where it is located in a state that prohibits disclosure the subpoena must be set aside.
The Court of Appeal also relied upon an American case where the court had said: The fact that a corporation's records and documents are physically located beyond the confines of the United States does not excuse it from producing them if they are in its possession and the court has jurisdiction of the corporation. The test is control, not location of the records.
4
The Frischke and the Spencer cases indicate that Canadian courts will not punish resident Canadian citizens or non-resident foreign nationals in Canada for complying outside Canada with the laws of foreign states properly applicable to matters within their territory, as it would be unfair to place such persons, especially non-party litigants, in a position that whatever they do subjects them to sanctions in Canada or in a foreign state.
Where two states issue directly conflicting commands, international law, starting from the basic notions of sovereignty and equality of states, accords primacy to the commands taken within their respective territories. This statement explains the divergent decisions reached in Frischke and Spencer. In Frischke the Ontario Court of Appeal could not require the bank to do an act (obtaining records) in Panama which was prohibited there. On the other hand in Spencer, the act (giving information based on memory) was to be done in Canada where it was not prohibited. It might have been different if Mr. Spencer had been asked to produce records which were physically located in the Bahamas. The Panamanian and Bahamian 13 United States v. Frank et al., 494 F.2d 145, at 156-57 (2nd Cir. 1974 in civil contempt for failing to comply with an order of that court enforcing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum. A United States federal grand jury conducting a tax and narcotics investigation issued a subpoena to the bank which was served in 1981 on its Miami office, calling for the production of certain bank records maintained at its branch offices in Nassau, the Bahamas, and Antigua in the Antilles' relating to the bank accounts of one of its customers. The Bank of Nova Scotia's Miami agent appeared before the grand jury and formally declined to produce the documents in question, in part on the ground that compliance with the subpoena without the customer's consent or an order of a Bahamian court would violate Bahamian bank secrecy laws.' He also contended that alternative methods were available to obtain these documents that would not require the bank to violate foreign laws. ' Leaving aside American constitutional law issues, posed by the District Court were upheld by the Court of Appeals against a non-resident alien officer of a bank located in the Grand Cayman Island, British West Indies. Having been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating the use of foreign banks in evading tax enforcement while present in the United States, he refused to answer the questions put to him by the grand jury concerning his bank and its clients on the ground that by testifying he would subject himself to criminal penalties in his country of residence. Except for the fact that the bank officer was still resident in the Grand Cayman Island, the facts of the case resemble those in Spencer. In the Bank of Nova Scotia case, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the situation before it was similar to that in Field in all material respects. Thus, the balancing of competing interests test of section 40 of the Restatement Second 2 " which was applied in Field yielded identical results here because the vital role of a grand jury's investigative function to the American system of jurisprudence and the crucial importance of the collection of revenue to the financial integrity of the United States outweighed the Bahamian interest in the right of privacy of banking transactions. The court rejected all the grounds advanced by the bank to distinguish Field from the immediate case. The fact that in Field the bank itself and not just its customers were under investigation by the grand jury was deemed to be irrelevant as in both cases the concern 21 Supra note 13.
S. 40 provides: Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as (a) vital national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state, (d) the nationality of the person, and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
was the proliferation of foreign secret bank accounts utilized by Americans to evade income taxes and conceal crimes. The bank's argument that the present situation was different because documentary evidence was requested rather than testimonial evidence as in Field was also rejected, quite correctly, on the ground that irrespective of the form of the requested information, its effect on the competing state interests would be the same. The last argument advanced by the bank for distinguishing Field, that the instant subpoena called for the disclosure of information located in a foreign state instead of the United States, was also dismissed since the disclosure would occur in the United States and the affront to the Bahamas would be the same no matter where the information was originally located. In other words, the interest of the Bahamas in preserving the secrecy of the bank records was impinged by the fact of the disclosure itself. This is a valid argument only if the Bahamian law applies extraterritorially. If one considers the situation in Frischke, Spencer, and Bank of Nova Scotia, one must admit that the distinctions sought to be made with respect to the location of the information pertain more to semantics than logic and realism. Actually, it does not matter where the information is located or where it is disclosed. The form of the disclosure is equally unimportant. What is important is the disclosure. That, as the Court of Appeals said, is the affront to the state that wishes to preserve the secrecy of bank accounts. The violation of that state's laws takes place when the information is disclosed at home or abroad in any manner.
In the Bank of Nova Scotia case, the Court of Appeals did not seem to be inclined to consider alternative methods for obtaining the requested information in order to respect the sovereignty of a friendly foreign state because of the possible delays and expenses involved and the uncertain likelihood of success in obtaining an order for judicial assistance in the Bahamas. Practical reasons were improperly advanced in order to avoid complying with the comity of nations. The real basis for rejecting alternative methods of compliance was that they would not have afforded due deference to United States interests. Why should the United States government ask the courts of the Bahamas to be allowed to do something lawful under American law! If that is the case, why has the United States entered into special international agreements that provide for judicial assistance?
The " also involved civil contempt proceedings for the failure by the bank to comply with a grand jury subpoena served in 1983 on its Miami office requesting it to produce financial records pertaining to narcotics investigation suspects, held by its branches in the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Antigua. 4 In an effort to comply with the subpoena, the bank filed a petition before the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands for permission to produce the records. This petition was denied and the bank specifically ordered not to produce them. Later on, however, the Governor of the Islands, acting in conformity with the provisions of the confidentiality statute, authorized their disclosure." The main issue was whether the bank had failed to exercise good faith in its efforts to comply with the subpoena. The bank was found in contempt by the District Court and its decision was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals after an initial appeal to that court had resulted in a remand.
2 " In finding against the bank the Court of Appeals reviewed the way in which the District Court had balanced the several factors enumerated in section 40 of the Restatement Second.
"7 Clearly, the United States' interest in stemming the narcotics trade outweighed the Cayman Islands' interest in preserving bank secrecy as vital to the expansion of its principal industry. However, even there, it is recognized that bank secrecy should not be used to encourage or foster criminal activities. Thus, the policy of the Cayman Islands was held to be consistent with that of the United States. the present case American citizens were the object of the investigation, United States courts had a legitimate basis for examining their financial records. The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the disclosure and production of the records would take place in the United States and that their situs was not a decisive factor as contended by the Canadian government in its brief amicus curiae.
9 Furthermore, the Canadian nationality of the Bank of Nova Scotia was not important in view of its pervasive presence in the United States. By doing business there and in other foreign states, the bank had accepted the incident risk of occasional inconsistent governmental actions." 0 The fact that a person may be held criminally liable for acts that are legal where performed is not unusual. This type of liability can be justified under the passive personality principle or the protective principle." The Court of Appeals also was of the opinion that the single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 3 " which binds the United States and the Cayman Islands does not contain exclusive means for the exchange of information between the contracting parties that should have been followed. It could not impair the investigatory powers granted to the grand jury under United States law. The Convention was adopted to aid, not to hinder, the enforcement of drug-trafficking laws. Therefore, it did not require greater deference to the law of the Cayman Islands than that recognized in the balancing test found in the Restatement Second.
[TIhere is nothing in the statute to suggest that it is the public policy of the Cayman Islands to permit a person to launder the proceeds of crime in the Cayman Islands, secure from detection and punishment. The Restatement Second test is clearly deficient in its treatment of vital national interests as it provides no meaningful guidelines for balancing conflicting national interests and does not require that these interests be evaluated according to their particular importance in each case. The courts should be forced to examine the policies that underlie the foreign state's interests in enacting the law under review."
The availability of viable alternatives to obtain the information sought should also be considered as a matter of course when balancing competing interests. This is recognized by section 420(2) (a) of 
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable is judged by evaluating all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate, (a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state: (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that inight be protected or hurt by the regulation in question; (e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international political, legal or economic system; (f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states. (3) When more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by two or more on jurisdiction to prescribe and uses as a criterion the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction, will not make things easier as the courts will still have to evaluate all relevant factors including their own state interests. True comity implies self-restraint and accommodation of the interests of other states based on reciprocity, but this is difficult to achieve as our courts are not equipped to ascertain such interests. Deference seems to be a one-way street as in most cases it means deference to the interests of the state whose courts are doing the evaluation. Foreign government compulsion should certainly be a valid defence to contempt sanctions where the witness is not a target of the investigation and has made a serious effort to comply with the discovery order.
The Bank of Nova Scotia cases should not be read as holding that all of the bank's Canadian and foreign activities and operations were subject to the jurisdiction of the federal grand jury and federal courts. Since the bank was conducting some of its banking operations through a branch in Miami which was a conduit for its international banking business, it was properly subject to the jurisdiction of the United States with respect to these operations. Jurisdiction was based on the fact that the bank had a fixed place of business in Florida where it conducted banking operations that were material to the grand jury investigation. Thus, it cannot be said that the Bank of Nova Scotia was a totally disinterested third party. It could be argued that by doing business in Florida through an agency or a branch, the Canadian company subjected itself to United States jurisdiction since it had total control over its Miami agency. However, reaching the foreign parent through a local wholly-owned subsidiary is a procedure that is not free from controversy."t
CANADIAN RESPONSES
The position of American courts with respect to non-disclosure laws has been widely criticized as another example of the extraterritorial application of the laws of the United States. In response, Canada has enacted blocking statutes designed to prevent disclosure of information to foreign courts and investigative bodies in certain circumstances. For instance, section 3(I) (a) and (c) of the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 38 provides that the Attorney General of Canada may by order prohibit or restrict the production "before or the disclosure or identification to, or for the purposes of a foreign tribunal or records that, at any time while the order is in force, are in Canada or are in the possession or under the control of a Canadian citizen or a person resident in Canada" or "the giving by a person, at a time when he is a Canadian citizen or a resident of (0) which deals with the production of documents in the possession of a person not a party to the action does not cover the production of documents within the possession of and representing the property of a partially controlled or even a wholly-owned subsidiary company of the company or person to whom the court's order is directed. The court refused to pierce the corporate veil. Canada, of information before, or for the purposes of, a foreign tribunal in relation to the contents or identification of, records that, at any time while the order is in force, are or were in Canada or under the control of a Canadian citizen or a person resident in Canada" if doing so has or is likely to affect adversely significant Canadian interests in relation to international trade or commerce involving a business carried on in whole or in part in Canada or otherwise infringe Canadian sovereignty. This section, if it were invoked by the Attorney General of Canada in a situation similar to that which existed in the Bank of Nova Scotia cases, would not be effective when the United States is not seeking evidence in Canada.
CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
What is the solution? One could adopt the solution proposed by Mr. Justice Estey in the Spencer case and the Draft Restatement Second (Revised) and require the person to whom the order is directed to make an effort in good faith to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available. However, this may not always be possible, especially in the case of tax evasion. Furthermore, to require the courts to consult affected foreign states before issuing compulsory process may constitute a usurpation of the functions of the executive branch of the government. Judicial restraint and deferral, except pursuant to a domestic statute or an international treaty, is far too unpredictable in the best of circumstances."
The principle of the sovereign equality of states requires a political solution based on reciprocity which must go beyond diplomatic representations and informal arrangements or understandings and take the form of a treaty 4 " or other formal intergovernmental agreement.
S3
For a review of possible solutions in the antitrust field, see Castel, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1o 5 et seq. Note that in 1985 a Subpoena Working Group comprising legal officials of Canada and the United States was created which provides an informal "early warning" mechanism and forum for consultations on practical approaches that may avoid the conflicts caused in the Bank of Nova Scotia case. 40 Note that in the 1984 Bank of Nova Scotia case the Court of Appeals refused to apply a "Gentleman's Agreement" between the United States and the Cayman Islands on the ground that it was not a formal intergovernmental agreement and was not considered binding by the parties. At most it was a simple understanding as to how informal requests for assistance were to be channelled between the parties.
On March 9, 1984, Canada and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding which provides for notification and consultation in the antitrust field in order to minimize conflicts between the two countries.
4 Paragraph 8 of this Understanding is of particular interest as it deals with information to be obtained from private persons:
(i) Either Party may utilize whatever means it considers necessary to obtain for antitrust investigations and proceedings relevant information located in its own territory, whether or not an entity from which information is sought has a parent or subsidiary in the territory of the other. Where, in the opinion of the investigating Party, information is adequately available from sources within its territory, that Party will, in the first instance, attempt to obtain such information from those sources before seeking it from the territory of the other Party. (3) If a Party intends to seek information located in the territory of the other Party, it will attempt to obtain the information by voluntary means in the first instance, unless it concludes that in the specific circumstances compulsory process should be used. Examples of such circumstances include, but are not limited to, concern that evidence might otherwise be destroyed or removed or that voluntary compliance would not be forthcoming. If the Party in whose territory the information is located requests consultations, the process normally will not be issued until there has been a reasonable opportunity for consultation. If exceptional circumstances require that the process be issued before there has been an opportunity for requested consultation, the Party that issued the process will not seek to enforce compliance until a reasonable period for consultation, if requested, has elapsed. (4) When requests for information located in the territory of the other are made, they will be framed as narrowly and specifically as possible in order to minimize the financial and administrative burden on the recipient. (5) After notification and consultation or waiver thereof, and subject to paragraph 5, voluntary in-person interviews with private persons may generally be conducted in the territory of the other Party. Such Party retains the right to attach any conditions to the conduct of an interview that it deems appropriate, including the attendance of its officials at such interviews.
This Understanding is not a formal agreement. It simply reiterates in a more elaborate form the Recommendation of September 25, In the case of civil and commercial actions, the 1970 Hague Convention on the taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters to which the United States is a party" cannot be used by our courts since Canada has not yet signed and ratified it but is planning to do so as soon as the provinces have passed the necessary implementing legislation. Even if it were in force between the two countries, it may not be effective in certain cases as a letter of request cannot be used to obtain evidence which is not intended for use in judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated." Furthermore, according to Article 23, "A contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." To date, twelve of the sixteen signatory states have made such a declaration. Therefore, it would be difficult if not impossible to resort to the procedure contemplated by the Convention for pre-trial discovery and an order would not be made unless there was already an action pending before the courts of the requesting state.
In gation conducted by agencies with law enforcement responsibilities and in ensuing criminal, civil and administrative proceedings, hereinafter referred to as "legal proceedings." 5. Information made available pursuant to these procedures may be used freely in ensuing legal proceedings in the requesting state in which an agency of the requesting state having law enforcement responsibilities is a party, and the parties shall use their best efforts to furnish the information for purposes of such legal proceedings in such form as to render it admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence in existence in the requesting state, including, but not limited to, certifications, authentications, and such other assistance as may be necessary to provide the foundation for the admissibility of evidence. 6. The parties shall give advance notice and afford an opportunity for consultation prior to the use, within the meaning of paragraph 5, of any information made available pursuant to these procedures. 8. The parties shall use their best efforts to assist in the expeditious execution of letters rogatory issued by the judicial authorities of their respective countries in connection with any legal proceedings which may ensue in their respective countries. 9. The assistance to be rendered to a requesting state shall not be required to extend to such acts by the authorities of the requested state as might result in the immunization of any person from prosecution in the requested state. Io. All actions to be taken by a requested state will be performed subject to all limitations imposed by the domestic law of the country concerned. Execution of a request for assistance may be postponed or denied if execution would interfere with ongoing investigations or legal proceedings, criminal, civil and administrative, in the requested state.
In the criminal field, the United States and Canada are parties to several multilateral conventions that contain specific provisions for the transmission of letters of request relating to the offences listed in these conventions. The OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises has also been concerned with conflicting requirements imposed on multinational enterprises and on May i8, 1984, the Council of this organization agreed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral co-operation in intergovernmental conflicts involving multilateral enterprises. 48 To this end, the ministers reviewed the 1976 Declaration and Guidelines on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, and in particular endorsed a series of recommendations concerning methods to ameliorate conflicting requirements imposed on multinational enterprises by various jurisdictions. The pertinent part of these recommendations states:
27. In contemplating new legislation, action under existing legislation or other exercise of jurisdiction which may conflict with the legal requirements or established policies of another Member country and lead to conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational enterprises, the Member countries concerned should:
(i) Have regard to relevant principles of international law; (ii) Endeavour to avoid or minimize such conflicts and the problems to which they give rise by following an approach of moderation and restraint, respecting and accommodating the interests of other Member countries; (iii) Take fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic, law enforcement and other interests of other Member countries... 28 . Member countries should endeavour to promote co-operation as an alternative to unilateral action to avoid or minimise conflicting requirements and problems arising therefrom. Member countries should on request consult one another and endeavour to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to such problems. (1983) , 12 Int'l Monetary Fund Survey 201), to which the central banks of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States are parties, has established the framework of an international supervisory system of transnational banking operations. Under this Concordat, gaps in regulations are to be filled by either host or home state, and overlaps are to be worked out between the regulatory authorities of the two states having jurisdiction so as to avoid conflicts and uncertainty.
of Canadian officials whenever the actions of one state are likely to affect another adversely." 0 To be fully effective such co-operation and consultation should take the form of a comprehensive formal mutual assistance agreement.
This was done on March 18, 1985, when Canada and the United States signed a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters."' According to Article 2, the parties shall provide mutual legal assistance in all matters relating to the investigation, prosecution, and suppression of offences. Such assistance shall include, inter alia, taking the evidence of persons, providing documents and records, and executing requests for searches and seizures. A party seeking to obtain documents or records located in the territory of the other party shall request assistance in accordance with the provisions of the treaty except as otherwise agreed pursuant to other agreements, arrangements, or practices. Where denial of a request or delay in its execution may jeopardize the successful completion of an investigation or prosecution, the parties shall promptly consult, at the instance of either party, to consider alternative means of assistance. 52 The requested state may deny assistance to the extent that execution of the request is contrary to its public interest. 53 This provision resembles that found in the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.
5
Thus, if the Canadian government has decided that it is in its public interest to prevent the disclosure of certain evidence pursuant to the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act," 5 co-operation will not take place.
The treaty indicates to whom and how requests shall be made. The courts of the requested state shall have jurisdiction to issue subpoenas, search warrants, or other orders necessary to execute the request.
5 7 In all cases the request shall be executed in the requested state only to the extent not prohibited by its law. Thus, it will not be executed if it involves violating the law of the requested state.
"
The requesting state shall not disclose or use information or evidence furnished for purposes other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the Central Authority of the requested state.
5
" Article 12 makes it quite clear that a person requested to testify and produce documents, records, or other articles in the requested state may be compelled to do so only in accordance with the requirements of the law of the requested state.
Finally, it should be noted that the Central Authority of either party shall notify the Central Authority of the other party of proceeds of crime believed to be located in the territory of the other party (e.g., local bank accounts)."o The parties shall also assist each other to the extent permitted by their respective laws in proceedings related to the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime and the collection of fines imposed as a sentence in a criminal prosecution.
1 This means that Canadian courts must abandon the rule that they will not recognize and enforce United States criminal laws and judgments imposing a monetary penalty.
2 The banks will also have to co-operate with the Central Authorities in order to return money that has been laundered through their agencies.
This treaty, which contains many other important provisions not relevant to this note, represents the most comprehensive approach to legal assistance in criminal matters and should serve as a model for other states. It respects the principle of sovereign equality of states as it recognizes the interests of both parties in a very realistic fashion.
It also leaves open other available avenues for international judicial assistance. This is international comity at its best. Once proclaimed in force, the treaty should eliminate frictions between Canada and 57 Art. 7. 5 Ibid. 59 Art. 9. "Central Authority" means for Canada the Minister of Justice or officials designated by him and for the United States of America, the Attorney General or officials designated by him (Art. i). 60 Art. 17. 61 
Ibid.
62 See Castel, op. cit. supra note 9, para. 88. tional legal assistance in civil, commercial, and criminal matters is the only practical way in which true justice can be extended to all.
J.-G. CASTEL
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Most provinces have adopted an Interprovincial Subpoena Act which facilitates the enforcement of a subpoena or other document from a court outside the province requiring a person to attend as a witness. The legislation does not apply to a subpoena issued with respect to a criminal offence under an Act of Canada. See, for instance, S.A. 
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